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Abstract 
This paper proposes a theoretical solution to the problem of Social Engineering (SE) 
attacks perpetrated over the phone lines.  As a byproduct real time attack signatures are 
generated, which can be used in a cyber forensic analysis of such attacks.  Current 
methods of SE attack detection and prevention rely on policy and personnel training, 
which fails because the root of the problem, people, are still involved.  The proposed 
solution relies on computer systems to analyze phone conversations in real time and 
determine if the caller is deceiving the receiver.  This Social Engineering Defense 
Architecture (SEDA) is completely theoretical as the technologies employed are only in 
the proof of concept phase, but they are all proven to be tractable problems.   
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Introduction 
  Social Engineering (SE) presents an interesting problem to cyber forensics that 
has not been researched enough; this is evident by the lack of formal published research 
on the topic.  The research that does focus specifically on SE, as it is used to commit 
computer related crimes, primarily define SE and the techniques that can be used to 
breach security.  No research has been preformed on forensic analysis of these attacks.  
The only type of solution or ideas presented to detect or trace attacks is the education of 
personnel on SE techniques.  An example of this is found in the Information Security 
Management Handbook.  The chapter entitled Social engineering: The forgotten risk by 
Rogers and Berti (2002) discusses how to prevent SE attacks.  Most of their suggestions 
are security policies and training of personnel to be aware of what an attack may look 
like, both of which are still dependant upon the human element.  Dolan (2004) makes 
similar suggestions for detecting SE attacks.  He claims, “Successful social engineering 
attacks rely on the employees of an organization.  To contain such an attack, employees 
must be well trained and familiar with common SE techniques”  (p. 6).   
  In 1997 the Client Server Computing magazine published the article Liar, Liar by 
Julie Bort.  In this article Bort states, “Of the 384 respondents who confessed to being 
attacked over the last year, social engineering was to blame in 15 percent of the cases--
the second largest cause” (p. 40).  While this is somewhat outdated, it clearly shows that 
SE is neither a new or small problem.  This was the only statistic available that directly 
measured the prevalence of SE attacks.  Other more current publications like the FBI/CSI 
annual Computer Crime and Security reports, from 2002, 2003, and 2004, showed some 
vague statistics on telecom fraud that could include SE.  More details on these reports are Detecting Social Engineering 
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provided in the Financial Findings section (Gordon, et. al., 2004; Power, 2002; 
Richerdson, 2003).   
  Bort states in her article, “There is no hardware or software that can defend your 
information systems against a human being telling a convincing lie (Bort, p. 40).”  This 
was true in 1997 but Raskin et. al. (2004) are currently researching the problem of lie 
detection in natural language and are making progress.  They have proven it to be a 
tractable problem and created a working model.   
Statement of Problem 
  Social Engineering (SE) attacks are a current threat to organizations large and 
small, for profit and non-profit alike.  However, the focus of most cyber forensics is on 
attacks perpetrated through computer systems alone.  This results in a very limited idea of 
how to perform a forensic analysis of a SE attack.  There are no documented signatures 
for such attacks or systems to log activity associated with SE.  This means that even if it 
can be determined that a SE attack occurred, it is very unlikely that the crime can be 
traced back to the perpetrator in such a way that they can be prosecuted in a court of law.  
These attack signatures are somewhat elusive because of the nature of SE and the 
avenues of attack used, most commonly the telephone system.  There are other avenues 
that can be used such as face-to-face conversations, but they are much more rare as the 
risk incurred to the attacker greatly increases when entering the target premises.  These 
are the factors that lead this paper to focus primarily on the telephone system to derive an 
architecture that generates attack signatures.  The attack signatures will be generated in 
real time allowing the logging architecture to also serve as a defense architecture much in 
the same way a Network Intrusion Detection System works.   Detecting Social Engineering 
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Social Engineering 
Aaron Dolan defines SE as “using relationships with people to attain a goal (p. 
2).”  For the purposes of this paper, the term SE will be discussed specifically as the 
malicious intent of cyber attackers attempting to illegally compromise an organization’s 
assets (Dolan, 2004).  It should be noted that the types of organizations under SE attacks 
are not limited to faceless multinational corporations.  Educational institutes, banks, and 
even the corner video store are at risk.   
Methods 
  Social engineers, akin to computer hackers, take advantage of weaknesses in the 
system in place to keep enemies out, and assist insiders.  As Dolan (2004) stated: 
“Social engineers use tactics to leverage trust, helpfulness, easily attainable 
information, knowledge of internal processes, authority, technology and any 
combination there of.  They often use several small attacks to put them in the 
position to reach their final goal.  Social engineering is all about taking advantage 
of others to gather information and infiltrate an attack.  The information gained in 
a phone book may lead to a phone call.  The information gained in the phone call 
may lead to another phone call.  A social engineer builds on each tidbit of 
information he or she gains to eventually stage a final, deadly attack.  A 
successful social engineering attempt could result in great financial loss for the 
target company.  A motivated attacker will be willing to gain information in any 
way possible” (p. 3).   
One very important reason that SE is so easily achieved is that people in general 
have the desire to help others, and gain satisfaction from it (Dolan, 2004).  One of the Detecting Social Engineering 
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most fundamental skills of a social engineer is the ability to establish trust.  This can be 
accomplished by masquerading as someone an employee should trust.  Typically most of 
the information necessary to steal someone’s identity for a SE attack is publicly available.  
Reverse phone look-up directories are available on the web free of charge, (e.g. 
http://www.reversephonedirectory.com/).  Once a phone number or address is obtained 
the other follows effortlessly.  Many organization’s web pages hold vast quantities of 
information such as organizational charts, which provides social engineers with a target 
from which to steal an identity or claim association.  Another common technique is for a 
social engineer to ask to be transferred to an employee from one of the main telephone 
operators.  The receiver of the transfer call does not have a phone number that is posted 
publicly, so anyone that calls them is already considered an insider to the receiver of the 
call as they were able to find the number, assumedly from the company phonebook.  This 
can prove to be a strong enough credential to allow more internal numbers to leak out, 
furthering the social engineer’s cache of information.   
  A few more examples of SE attacks that Wendy Arthurs stated in her paper are as 
follows (Arthurs, 2001): 
“IT Support – Somebody, claiming to be from the company’s IT support group, 
phones a user and explains that he is fault finding on the network.  He has limited 
the fault to within the users department but he needs a user ID and password from 
that department to finish tracing the problem.  Unless the user has been properly 
educated in security practices, he will very likely give the “trouble-shooter” his 
information.   
 Detecting Social Engineering 
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Manager – The social engineer, using a perceived position of authority, phones 
the help desk demanding to know why he can’t log on with his password. He then 
intimidates the help desk into giving him a new password by telling them he only 
has a limited time to retrieve some information for a report to the company vice 
president.  He may also threaten to report the help desk employee to his 
supervisor.     
 
Trusted Third Party – The social engineer phones the help desk, claiming to be 
Susan Sly, the vice-president’s executive assistant, stating the vice-president has 
authorized her to collect the information.  If the help desk employee balks, she 
threatens job loss or a report to the employee’s supervisor”  (p. 2). 
It can be seen from these examples that a large portion of the attacks are committed over 
the phone and rely on the fact that the receiver of the call has to take the caller’s word 
that they are who they say they are.  There is typically no form of authentication other 
than verbal quizzes regarding information only an employee should know.   
Motivation 
  The motivation for SE attacks varies between a sense of curiosity and challenge 
seeking, to directed attacks with the intent to compromise an organization’s assets.  The 
Hackers Manifesto gives us a brief insight into why hackers desire to break into secure 
areas.  The claim is that of curiosity and a quest for knowledge.  While harm may not be 
the intent, it is clear that great harm can be caused by such activities.  Some social 
engineers also seek a challenge, something to test their skills on (Mentor, 1986).   Detecting Social Engineering 
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  The more troublesome type of attack is that of a social engineer with a purpose.  
The motivation could come from a recently fired employee seeking vengeance or a 
seasoned social engineer locating information for money.  This type of social engineer 
has a better chance of succeeding and causing considerable damage in the process as they 
have much greater motivation to succeed and potentially more resources at their disposal 
(Dolan, 2004).   
Targets 
The types of targets for any SE attack range from product designs to personal 
employee information.  However, it is important to note that these are only the end 
targets of the attack, and many small pieces of information must be obtained before the 
final target can be reached.  The types of targets used to reach a final goal can include 
company policy or protocol, company phone books, organization trees, or server names.  
Most of this type of data is either easily obtainable with a call or is publicly available on 
the company website.  The real challenge is protecting such seemingly trivial information 
it in such a way as not to interfere too greatly with day-to-day workflow (Rogers & Berti, 
2002).   
Current solution 
The current solution to SE attacks is employee training to resist such attacks 
coupled with a thorough security policy.  This solution is fundamentally flawed as it 
relies on humans to patch the security holes.  The flaw is that human trust is the 
vulnerability exploited, which is deeply imbedded in US culture and is difficult to 
overcome (Rogers & Berti, 2002).  A good social engineer will convince you that he or 
she deserves the requested data, and you are hurting the company by not complying.  Detecting Social Engineering 
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Training may stop most menial or juvenile attackers, but a seasoned social engineer will 
never be thought of as a risk when employees talk to them, so the training will never be 
triggered.  This can be seen with the examples of SE attacks in the Social Engineering 
section above (Rogers & Berti, 2002).   
Policy 
  Employing security policy is a good idea in the sense that after someone has 
broken the policy it is easy to point to the policy and show how they violated it.  
However, it is not realistic to use policy alone to prevent break-ins.  Security policy that 
classifies data into different levels of sensitivity is the most beneficial to prevent SE 
attacks.  This provides a greater level of security for data that warrants it by forcing a 
higher level of credentials to gain access.  The end result is more work for the social 
engineer, which will deter most inexperienced and casual social engineers.  However, an 
experienced, or more importantly, persistent social engineer will keep working until they 
have all the necessary credentials to obtain approval for access.  Allen (2003) states the 
following as policy based counter measures to SE attacks in his paper: 
“Security policy - A sound security policy will ensure a clear direction on what is 
expected of staff within an organization. For example, support teams should only 
offer assistance for a defined range of activities.   
Limit Data leakage - Reducing the amount of specific data available will ensure 
that the attack is not an effortless exercise.  For example websites, public 
databases, Internet registries, and other publicly accessible data sources should 
only list generic information, such as main organization phone number and job Detecting Social Engineering 
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titles instead of employee name(s), for example 'site administrator' instead of 'Joe 
Bloggs'”  (p. 5).   
 
Training 
  Currently the most effective deterrent to SE is training employees to resist such 
attacks.  Training ranges from a multi day seminar once a year to every day reminders in 
the form of posters and mailings.  The idea is if everyone in the company is aware of how 
a social engineer executes an attack and gains trust, they will be able to detect an attack in 
progress and stop it.  Employees will also be told not to release certain types of data over 
the phone, like password or employee ID number.  One of the problems with this is a 
good social engineer never shows any signs of an attacker, they very quickly assimilate 
into the company and at worst appear as a employee trying to go the extra mile or in need 
of help.  It is not realistic to expect employees to be the primary defense against SE 
attacks, but it is logical to make them aware of it.  At worst it will help in the acceptance 
of any systems put in place to defend against SE attacks (Rogers & Berti, 2002).   
Financial Findings 
  The closest thing to reports of the prevalence and trends of SE attacks was in the 
CSI/FBI Computer Crime And Security Survey (Gordon et. al., 2004; Power, 2002; 
Richardson, 2003).  The survey has an attack grouping titled Telecom Fraud.  However, 
based on the data it seems that this is more likely this is in reference to a company’s 
phone switch being hacked.  Regardless, the report shows that percentage of respondents 
detecting telecom fraud decreased from 17% in 1999 to 11% in 2000, then to 10% in 
2001, and to 9% in 2002.  The percentage did rise to 10% in 2003, but the increase seems Detecting Social Engineering 
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negligible.  The finical loss due to telecom fraud is listed at $773,000 in 1999, $4,028,000 
in 2000, $9,041,000 in 2001, $346,000 in 2002, and $701,500 in 2003.  While it is 
difficult to determine if SE attacks are encapsulated within Telecom Fraud the data points 
to the problem becoming less important.  The reason it does not seem plausible that this 
data reflects SE attacks is that no current method exists to determine if a social engineer 
has attacked an organization.  No logs are generated when a call is placed, so there is no 
way to check after an attack has occurred.  It is the job of a social engineer to complete an 
objective without sounding any alarms so they can return later for more information if 
necessary.  This is different than a computer attacker whom might leave a back door for 
later use, in that case there is something to find or detect, like unsolicited outbound 
traffic.  A social engineer will keep all the data he or she needs to masquerade as an 
employee again later, this cannot easily be detected.   
Success of Current Solution 
  Unfortunately it is impossible with the available data to determine what effect the 
current methods of attack prevention and detection have had on the success of SE attacks.  
It could be reasoned that the general lack of data shows the inadequacy of current 
methods of detection.  If there were no Network Intrusion Detection Systems how would 
one measure the amount of attacks?  This inability produce data logically points to the 
current solution’s overwhelming inadequacy.   
Case Study 
  There are no case studies of SE attacks subverting the current solution.  It is very 
unlikely that this is because it has never happened, but rather that those that are beaten Detecting Social Engineering 
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don’t report it.  Rogers and Berti state as a possibility that SE “attacks the intelligence of 
the victim and, as such, there is a reluctance to admit that it has occurred” (2002, p. 52).   
Proposed Solution 
  To mitigate the risk of SE attacks perpetrated over the telephone consider the 
following.  A Social Engineering Defense Architecture (SEDA) that both detects attacks 
as they occur over the phone and generates logs so attacks can be traced back to the 
attacker in a forensic analysis of the attack.  The system focuses on the telephone medium 
as Dolan (2004) and Gragg (2003) showed that most attacks are carried out over the 
phone.  This method will work because it detects attacks based on intent and deception 
instead of attack target.  Detecting a SE attack based on target is difficult because social 
engineers typically first pursue targets with seemingly very little importance as explained 
in the Social Engineering section.  However, this trivial information is then used to obtain 
more sensitive and well-guarded information.  This system will prevent both the early 
and later stages of a SE attack by detecting lying and deception.  Any company employee 
that is being deceived by a caller should be made aware of it regardless of whether the 
caller is a social engineer or not.   
Intrusion Detection 
  The primary purpose of the SEDA is to make call recipients within the company 
aware of callers that are attempting to deceive them or obtain information they don’t have 
permission to.  The muscle of the system is a text-independent voice signature 
authentication system.  Markowitz defines text-independent verification as “[accepting] 
any spoken input, making it possible to design unobtrusive, even invisible, verification 
applications that examine the ongoing speech of an individual” (Markowitz, 2000, p. 69).  Detecting Social Engineering 
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She then states, “The ability of text-independent technology to operate unobtrusively and 
in the background makes it attractive for customer related applications, because 
customers need not pause for a security check before moving on to their primary business 
objective” (Markowitz, 2000, p. 69).  The result is a system of authentication that hinders 
workflow as little as possible.  The voice signatures will be linked to a database of 
personal information possibly including name, corporate association, job title, and all 
phone numbers called from.  The type of information gathered would depend on the 
needs of the organization employing the SEDA.  The main advantage of this tool is that 
social engineers often use identity theft to build trust as can be seen in the Social 
Engineering section above.  This system would prevent a social engineer from claiming 
to be an employee, even if they have all the right information pass as one in conversation.  
It would also make life much more difficult for a social engineer that keeps changing 
their name.  The first time the attacker calls the name they use will be associated with 
their voice signature, so if they want to call under another name they would have to 
modify their voice.  While this is a problem, most attackers will be deterred by the 
system, and those that do modify their voice will still have to deal with the attack 
detection systems described below.  This and further problems are discussed in greater 
detail below in the Caveats and Problems section.  
  The next important part of the SEDA is a voice-to-text engine.  This converts the 
entire voice conversation into text in real time.  There are examples of some systems, that 
while not accurate or reliable enough, were able to convert voice into text (Karat et. al., 
1999; Lia & Vergo, 1997).  While this is not directly related to preventing SE attacks it 
allows other powerful attack detection algorithms to analyze the conversation.  The Detecting Social Engineering 
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important note about this system is that it will need to be very fast and accurate.  If the 
text cannot be sent for analysis quickly enough, the attacker could obtain the information 
necessary before the recipient of the call can be notified that an attack is in progress.  
Also, the voice-to-text system must be robust enough to deal with less than perfect 
telephone connections.  It should be noted that to assist forensics analysis all 
conversations originating outside of the company phone switch are recorded and the text 
of the conversation is linked with the caller and receiver voice signatures.  Because of the 
need to record conversations for security purposes each caller would have to opt-in by 
selecting a certain number when they first call in.  This removes the expectation of 
privacy associated with telephone conversations, and prevents the organization using the 
SEDA from breaking the Wire Tap Act (US Department of Justice, 1986).  If a caller 
does not want to opt-in to a secure call they will be transferred to an operator highly 
trained in resisting SE attacks, who will explain the purpose of the opt-in.   
  The “brains” behind the SEDA are the textual conversation analysis tools.  Based 
on the current computational demands of these tools they will probably have to be 
implemented on different servers to analyze the conversation in parallel.  The first 
content analysis tool is Raskin et al., Natural Language Processing program to determine 
if a person is lying.  While this program is currently not ready to be implemented into the 
SEDA, his research and progress shows that the problem of parsing a conversation and 
determining if someone is lying is tractable; it is a matter of time before it becomes a 
usable application (Raskin et. al., 2004).   
  Another content analysis tool that would be much more simple and narrow in its 
purpose could search the conversation for certain strings used in common attacks.  This is Detecting Social Engineering 
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synonymous to virus definitions.  If the caller says, “Please read me your username and 
password,” it is clear that either the caller has bad intent, or an employee is violating 
security policy, neither is acceptable.  These rules would have to be customized 
depending on desired security and other company policies.  Figure 1 is a decision tree 
that maps out how the SEDA is structured.  It should be noted that no action, other than 
notifying the receiver of the call, is taken when an attack is detected.  Further research is 
needed to determine the best course of action.   
Attack Signature Generation 
  As with computer attackers, some attacks get through no matter what is done to 
prevent them.  In the case of a very skilled social engineer breaking into an organization, 
the SEDA provides call logs to perform forensics analysis of the attack.  As noted above, 
every conversation originating outside the company phone switch is recorded in text 
format with the voice signatures linked for caller identification.  Text format will be used 
to provide both smaller amounts of storage needed and to allow forensic investigations to 
scan for clues without having to convert voice back into text.  These logs of 
conversations will allow a forensic analyst to trace a cyber crime back from the final 
target to the attacker.  The call logs could also be used in conjunction with other forensics 
methods to track an attacker.   
Caveats and Problems 
  One of the major problems with the proposed solution is its inability to handle 
voice modulation.  If an attacker were to pipe his or her voice through a voice modulation 
device during every call in an attack the ability to link the calls together in a forensic 
analysis would be greatly decreased.  However, voice modulation would have no effect Detecting Social Engineering 
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on the SEDA’s ability to detect deception based on conversation content.  A resourceful 
social engineer would not be able to bypass all of the SEDA’s levels of protection.  
Problems could also arise if the system were unable to handle poor telephone 
connections, for example, from an older cell phone.  If this could not be handled it would 
serve as another form of voice modulation.  A related problem is replay attacks; 
recording someone’s voice and playing it into the phone to authorize, then continue the 
conversation.  Text-independent voice signatures can be generated over the entire call to 
prevent this, and “many commercial speaker-verification systems look for telltale 
auditory signals, distortions, exact matches, and other indications that a recording has 
been used” (Markowitz, 2000, p. 68).   
some voice signature systems already detect such attacks (Markowitz, 2000, p. 69).   
  Another problem lies in how to introduce such a product to the business world.  
Since there is no current method to meter or gauge the damage of SE attacks, it is 
impossible to show why something like this is necessary or a finically sound investment.  
One solution is to conduct a study to generate such data based on what security personnel 
think is the amount of damage cause by SE attacks.   
Future Research 
  There are several areas within the proposed solution that are candidates for further 
research.  First is the handling of internal calls.  The proposed solution simply treats all 
calls equally regardless of the location of the caller.  For certain businesses this could be 
a great problem because of the quantity of internal calls.  If there were a way to 
streamline internal calls then the amount of processing power necessary could decrease 
greatly.   Detecting Social Engineering 
 
17 
  Another area that needs further research is other methods of detecting SE attacks.  
There are currently products in the market that tout lie detection based on voice analysis 
such as Nemesysco's Layered Voice Analysis (2004).  This could be integrated to provide 
a further level of attack detection.  Another attack detection method that could be added 
is to listen for account names adjacent to suspicious comments, then flag the account.   
  As mentioned earlier, research is needed to determine how to handle attacks when 
they are detected.  While this may vary depending on the security goals of the 
organization, certain attack response guidelines need to be formulated to aid in the 
creation of countermeasures.   
  The last area of future research is SE forensics.  With the new logs being 
generated by the SEDA, forensics tools need to be created to parse log files and find 
clues.  In addition, policy on how to conduct a SE cyber forensic investigation using the 
logs needs to be created.  Essentially all the research that has been done and is currently 
in progress on cyber forensics needs to be done in SE forensics.   
Conclusion 
  The main strength of the SEDA is it will take the human element out of 
determining a person’s identity over the phone.  Callers will be identified as employees 
or outsiders; this alone is crucial to preventing SE attacks.  The ability to detect deception 
also means a social engineer will not be able to appeal to someone’s emotions or try to 
bully him or her into an action.  Another great strength is the log files that are generated 
that allow for forensic analysis of SE attacks.  This opens up an entire new field in cyber 
forensics.  The weakness is that voice modulation makes it possible for one person to call 
many times under different names and not be tracked.  While this is a clear problem that Detecting Social Engineering 
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needs to be addressed with voice modulation detection, it does not undermine the entire 
SEDA.  Unfortunately, the proposed solution cannot be implemented currently, so it 
cannot be determined how affective it will be.   
  Despite the limitations, the SEDA addresses two major problems that have gone 
unanswered for several years, how to detect and how to perform a forensic analysis of a 
SE attack.  Detecting Social Engineering 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1.   Social Engineering Defense Architecture decision tree 
Figure 2.   Expansion of attack detection processes 
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** See Figure 2 
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